MSA-2015-03: iPass Mobile Client Service Local Privilege Escalation

From: Advisories <advisories@mogwaisecurity.de>
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com,fulldisclosure@seclists.org
Cc:
Subject: MSA-2015-03: iPass Mobile Client Service Local Privilege Escalation
Date:


 Mogwai Security Advisory MSA-2015-03
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  Title:              iPass Mobile Client service local privilege escalation
  Product:            Hewlett-Packard Universal CMDB (UCMDB)
  Affected versions:  iPass Mobile Client 2.4.2.15122 (Newer version might be
also affected)
  Impact:             medium
  Remote:             no
  Product link:       http://www.ipass.com/laptops/
  Reported:           11/03/2015
  by:                 Hans-Martin Muench (Mogwai, IT-Sicherheitsberatung Muench)


Vendor's Description of the Software:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The iPass Open Mobile client for laptops is lightweight and always on.
It provides easy, seamless connectivity across iPass, customer, and third-party
networks, and allows you to mix and match carrier networks without disrupting
your users.

The iPass Open Mobile client for laptops allows organizations to provide
granular
options for how employees connect to iPass Wi-Fi (the iPass Mobile Network),
campus Wi-Fi, mobile broadband (3G/4G), Ethernet, and dial, using a single
platform to manage all connections. Open Mobile also enables cost and security
controls that provide virtual private network (VPN) integration options; mobile
broadband 3G/4G usage controls for both data roaming and data usage; endpoint
integrity verification that checks the security of the device at the point of
connection; and several additional options for setting network connection and
restriction policies. Insight into an organization\u20ac\u2122s mobility usage is provided
through user and device activity and summary reports as well as mobile broadband
usage reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Vendor response:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
"We do not consider this a vulnerability as it is how the product was designed"

Business recommendation:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Disable the iPass service unless really required


-- CVSS2 Ratings ------------------------------------------------------

CVSS Base Score: 5.6
Impact Subscore: 7.8
Exploitability Subscore: 3.9
CVSS v2 Vector (AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:C/A:N)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------


Vulnerability description:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The iPass Open Mobile Windows Client utilizes named pipes for interprocess
communication. One of these pipes accepts/forwards commands to the iPass
plugin subsystem.

A normal user can communicate with this pipe through the command line client
EPCmd.exe which is part of the iPass suite. A list of available commands can
be displayed via "System.ListAllCommands".

The iPass pipe provides a "iPass.EventsAction.LaunchAppSysMode" command which
allows to
execute arbitrary commands as SYSTEM. This can be abused by a normal user to
escalate
his local privileges.

Please note that this issue can also be exploited remotely in version
2.4.2.15122 as
the named pipe can also be called via SMB. However according to our information,
the pipe is no longer remotely accessible in current versions of the iPass
Mobile
client.


Proof of concept:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The following EPCmd command line creates a local user "mogwai" with password
"mogwai":

EPCmd.exe iPass.EventsAction.LaunchAppSysMode c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe;"/c
net user mogwai mogwai /ADD;;

Disclosure timeline:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
10/03/2015: Requesting security contact from iPass sales
10/03/2015: Sales responded, will forward vulnerability information to the
development
11/03/2015: Sending vulnerability details
11/03/2015: iPass asks which customer we represent
11/03/2015: Responding that we don't represent any iPass customer
12/03/2015: iPass responded, wont fix, says that the product works as designed


Advisory URL:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.mogwaisecurity.de/#lab


----------------------------------------------------------------------
Mogwai, IT-Sicherheitsberatung Muench
Steinhoevelstrasse 2/2
89075 Ulm (Germany)

info@mogwaisecurity.de





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