Re: [oss-security] Re: [Full-disclosure] MySQL (Linux) Stack based- buffer overrun PoC Zeroday

From: Sergei Golubchik <serg@askmonty.org>
To: oss-security@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@redhat.com>,king cope <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@googlemail.com>,full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk,bugtraq@securityfocus.com,todd@packetstormsecurity.org,submit@offsec.com,Mitre CVE assign department <cve-assign@mitre.org>,Steven Christey <coley@mitre.org>,security@mariadb.org,security@mysql.com,Ritwik Ghoshal <ritwik.ghoshal@oracle.com>,moderators@osvdb.org
Subject: Re: [oss-security] Re: [Full-disclosure] MySQL (Linux) Stack based- buffer overrun PoC Zeroday
Date:


Hi, king cope!

On Dec 02, king cope wrote:
> Hi,
> My opinion is that the FILE to admin privilege elevation should be
> patched.  What is the reason to have FILE and ADMIN privileges
> seperated when with this exploit FILE privileges equate to ALL ADMIN
> privileges.
> I understand that it's insecure to have FILE privileges attached to a
> user.  But if this a configuration issue and not a vulnerability then
> as stated above there must be something wrong with the privilege
> management in this SQL server.

You've missed that part of my reply:

> > Additionally, MySQL (and MariaDB) provides a --secure-file-priv
> > option that allows to restrict all FILE operations to a specific
> > directory.

Normally, if a DBA wants to grant FILE privilege to users, the server
will have something like secure-file-priv=/tmp/mysql (for example)
specified in the configuration file. This way any operation allowed by
the FILE privilege (like SELECT ... OUTFILE) will only be able to access
files under the /tmp/mysql/ path.

Regards,
Sergei





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