Re: [FD] 15 TOTOLINK router models vulnerable to multiple RCEs

From: Joshua Wright <>
To: Pierre Kim <>
Cc:,fulldisclosure <>
Subject: Re: [FD] 15 TOTOLINK router models vulnerable to multiple RCEs

> Title: 15 TOTOLINK router models vulnerable to multiple RCEs
> Advisory URL:
> Blog URL:
> Date published: 2015-07-16
> Vendors contacted: None
> Release mode: 0days, Released
> CVE: no current CVE

This was my morning LOL:

$ curl -O
$ unzip TOTOLINK\ N300RG_8_70.bin
$ binwalk -e TOTOLINK\ N300RG_8_70.bin

0             0x0             uImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0xB0D462F0, created: 2013-08-19 07:55:35, image size: 1875904 bytes, Data Address: 0x80000000, Entry Point: 0x802CB000, data CRC: 0x6F60CB3, OS: Linux, CPU: MIPS, image type: OS Kernel Image, compression type: lzma, image name: "zn300rg"
64            0x40            LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 33554432 bytes, uncompressed size: 3038108 bytes
864256        0xD3000         Squashfs filesystem, little endian, non-standard signature, version 3.0, size: 1010967 bytes, 352 inodes, blocksize: 65536 bytes, created: 2013-08-19 07:55:31

$ grep -hR cgi-bin _TOTOLINK\ N300RG_8_70.bin.extracted/ 2>/dev/null
<meta http-equiv=refresh content="0; URL=/cgi-bin/timepro.cgi?tmenu=main_frame&smenu=main_frame">
   winurl = "/cgi-bin/timepro.cgi?tmenu=popup&smenu="+flag;
Binary file _TOTOLINK N300RG_8_70.bin.extracted/squashfs-root/bin/timepro.cgi matches
Binary file _TOTOLINK N300RG_8_70.bin.extracted/squashfs-root/bin/login-cgi/login.cgi matches
ScriptAlias /cgi-bin/ /bin/
Auth /cgi-bin /etc/httpd.passwd

I assume the conversation went like this:

DEV1: We need access to shell commands for the admin interface!
DEV2: OK, let’s ScriptAlias the system /bin directory to /cgi-bin/.
DEV1: Good idea.


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