RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory
| From: |
Dave Korn <dave.korn@artimi.com> |
| To: |
'Eric Rescorla' <ekr@networkresonance.com>,'Ben Laurie' <benl@google.com> |
| Cc: |
bugtraq@securityfocus.com,security@openid.net,'OpenID List' <general@openid.net>,cryptography@metzdowd.com,full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk |
| Subject: |
RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory |
| Date: |
Fri, 08 August 2008 16:31 GMT |
Eric Rescorla wrote on 08 August 2008 16:06:
> At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100,
> Ben Laurie wrote:
>> However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this
>> means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of
>> the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user
>> behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the attack.
>>
>> Therefore mitigation falls to other parties.
>>
>> 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default.
>
> Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client
> side?
Isn't that exactly what "Browsers must check CRLs" means in this context
anyway? What alternative client-side blacklisting mechanism do you suggest?
cheers,
DaveK
--
Can't think of a witty .sigline today....
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