Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
To: Perry E. Metzger <perry@piermont.com>
Cc: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>,Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>,Dave Korn <dave.korn@artimi.com>,bugtraq@securityfocus.com,security@openid.net,OpenID List <general@openid.net>,cryptography@metzdowd.com,full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory
Date:


On Fri, Aug 08, 2008 at 02:08:37PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> The kerberos style of having credentials expire very quickly is one
> (somewhat less imperfect) way to deal with such things, but it is far
> from perfect and it could not be done for the ad-hoc certificate
> system https: depends on -- the infrastructure for refreshing all the
> world's certs every eight hours doesn't exist, and if it did imagine
> the chaos if it failed for a major CA one fine morning.

The PKIX moral equivalent of Kerberos V tickets would be OCSP Responses.

I understand most current browsers support OCSP.

> One also worries about what will happen in the UI when a certificate
> has been revoked. If it just says "this cert has been revoked,
> continue anyway?" the wrong thing will almost always happen.

No doubt.





Copyright © 1995-2021 LinuxRocket.net. All rights reserved.