Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

From: Stefan Kanthak <stefan.kanthak@nexgo.de>
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com,full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Cc: George Carlson <gcarlson@vccs.edu>
Subject: Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)
Date:


"George Carlson" <gcarlson@vccs.edu> wrote:

> Your objections are mostly true in a normal sense.

And in abnormal sense?

> However, it is not true when Group Policy is taken into account.

Group Policies need an AD. Cached credentials are only used locally,
for domain accounts, when the computer can't connect to the AD.

> Group Policies differentiate between local and Domain administrators

Local administrators don't authenticate against an AD, they authenticate
against the local SAM. No GPOs there!
And: a local administrator can override ANY policy, even exempt the
computer completely from processing Group Policies.

> and so this
> vulnerability is problematic for shops that differentiate between
> desktop support and AD support.

Again: this is NO VULNERABILITY.
An administrator is an administrator is an administrator.

[braindead fullquote removed ]

Stefan





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