Re: MicroWorld MailScan - Multiple Vulnerabilities within Admin-Webinterface

From: oliver karow <oliver.karow@gmx.de>
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Cc:
Subject: Re: MicroWorld MailScan - Multiple Vulnerabilities within Admin-Webinterface
Date:

Attachments:
mailscan.txt

Please find attached the advisory regarding MicroWorld's MailScan for 
Mailservers.

Cheers,

Oliver 

MicroWorld MailScan - Multiple Vulnerabilities within Admin-Webinterface
========================================================================


>> Affected Products <<


   - MailScan for Mail Servers 
     
     * Version: 5.6.a with espatch1
     * Win32 Platform

   Other Mailscan Products, Versions, also, if available 
   for other platforms, were not tested.


>> Product/Company Information <<
 

   From MicroWorld's website: "MailScan 5.6 is the world's most 
   advanced Real-Time AntiVirus and AntiSpam solution for Mail Servers. 
   The software safeguards organizations against Virus, Worm, Trojan and 
   many other malware breeds with futuristic and proactive technologies. 
   Employing an array of intelligent filters, MailScan offers powerful 
   protection against Spam and Phishing mails along with comprehensive 
   Content Security."

   http://www.microworld.de
   http://www.mwti.net

>> Vulnerabilities <<


   MailScan offers "Web Based Administration". The administration console 
   (Server.exe) is running as an http service on tcp port 10443 with 
   LocalSystem privileges. The communication is plain http without SSL/TLS.

   The interface is vulnerable to the attacks described below. All attacks 
   do *not* require authentication.


-- >> Directory Traversal <<

   It is possible to access files on the system outside of the webroot 
   directory with privileges of the LocalSystem account:

     echo -e "GET /../../../../boot.ini HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" | nc <server> <port>


-- >> Authentication bypass <<

   After a login attempt with an invalid username and password, the application
   is setting a cookie at the webclient with the following content:

        Set-Cookie: User=admin; path=/
        Set-Cookie: login=true; path=/
        Set-Cookie: IsAdmin=false; path=/
        Set-Cookie: IP=; path=/


   Providing valid username and password will give a cookie with the 
   following content:

        Set-Cookie: User=admin; path=/
        Set-Cookie: login=true; path=/
        Set-Cookie: IsAdmin=true; path=/
        Set-Cookie: IP=; path=/

   It is sufficient to set the cookie as shown above to get authenticated on the
   admin interface. The user "admin" is a default account, with a password set during
   installation.

   *BUT* requesting a resource on the webserver *without* supplying a cookie will 
   also grant access to the requested resource. The attacker just needs to know 
   the path to the resource. 



-- >> Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) <<

   http://ip:10443/<script>alert("No_Problem_its_just_an_admin_interface")</script>



-- >> Access to Logfile <<


   It is possible to access the logfiles of the application because the folder 
   "/LOG" inside the webroot ("C:\Program Files\Common Files\MicroWorld\WebServer") 
   is not protected.... note that this does not require the directory traversal, 
   mentioned before and thus is imho a separate vuln.
   The logfiles contain different information, like installation path, ip adresses,
   and error messages.

     http://ip:10443/LOG/W072808.LOG (Format seems to be W:Month:Date:year)

      and

     http://ip:10443/LOG/Weblog.LOG

>> History <<

28. July 2008 - Touching base with MicroWorld's Support via Messenger
28. July 2008 - Sending High-Level description of vulns and RFP-Policy to agree
30. July 2008 - MicroWorld agreed to the policy
30. July 2008 - Detailed description and PoC-Script creating an admin user without
                authenticatin send to Microworld
01. Aug. 2008 - Asking Microworld if they were able to reproduce
02. Aug. 2008 - MicroWorld answered: "Not Yet"
05. Aug. 2008 - Asking Microworld if they were able to reproduce, and if yes, when
                a patch will be available
13. Aug. 2008 - No response from Microworld; I informed them that i will publish
                an advisory within the next days
15. Aug. 2008 - Advisory release


>> Credits <<

mail: Oliver-dot-karow-at-gmx-dot-de
advisory: http://www.oliverkarow.de/research/mailscan.txt
blog: http://oliver.greyhat.de/2008/08/15/multiple-vulnerabilities-within-mailscan-admin-interface/






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